We present a formal system to reason about and specify the behavior of multiple intelligent arti cial agents. Essentially, each agent can perform certain actions, and it may possess a variety of information in order to reason about its and other agent's actions. Thus, our KARO-framework tries to deal formally with the notion of Knowledge, possessed by the agents, and their possible execution of actions. In particular, each agent may reason about its |or, alternatively, other's| Abilities to perform certain actions, the possible Results of such an execution and the availability of the Opportunities to take a particular action. Formally, we combine dynamic and epistemic logic into one modal system, and add the notion of ability to it. We demonstrate that there are several options to de ne the ability to perform a sequentially composed action, and we outline several properties under two alternative choices. Also, the agents' views on the correctness and feasibility of their plans are highlighted. Finally, the complications in the completeness proof for both systems indicate that the presence of abilities in the logic makes the use of in nite proof rules useful, if not inevitable.
Introduction
The last ten years have witnessed an intense owering of interest in arti cial agents, both on a theoretical and on a practical level. The ACM devoted a special issue of its`Communications' to intelligent agents 6], and Scienti c American ranked intelligent software agents among the key technologies for the 21st century 35] . Also various conferences and workshops were initiated that speci cally address agents, their theories, languages, architectures and applications 8, 28, 49, 50] . Consequently, terms like agent-based computing, agent-based software engineering and agent-oriented programming have become widely used in research on AI. Despite its wide use, there is no agreement on what the term`agent' means. Riecken remarks that at best, there appears to be a rich set of emerging views' and that`the terminology is a bit messy ' 42] . Existing de nitions range from`any entity whose state is viewed as consisting of mental objects ' 46] and`autonomous objects with the capacity to learn, memorize and communicate ' 9] , to`systems whose behavior is neither casual nor strictly causal, but teleonomic, goal-oriented toward a certain state of the world ' 3] . Other authors, and truly not the least, use the term`robot' instead of agent 27], or take the common-sense de nition of Currently at ABN-AMRO, Amsterdam. agents for granted 40] . In practical applications agents are`personal assistant s] who are] collaborating with the user in the same work environment ' 34] , or`computer programs that simulate a human relationship, by doing something that another person could otherwise do for you ' 45] .
The informal description of an (arti cial) agent in its most primitive form, which we distill from the de nitions given above and which the reader is advised to keep at the back of his/her mind throughout reading this paper, is that of an entity which has the possibility to execute certain actions, and is in the possession of certain information, which allows it to reason about its own and other agents' actions. In general, these agents will also have motives that explain why they act the way they do. The treatment of these motives is however not the subject of this paper (but see 32] ). Moreover, although we borrow a lot of terminology and notions from philosophy, the reader should keep in mind that it is our main goal to describe arti cial agents, rather than humans.
Currently several applications of agent-technology are in use. Among those listed by Wooldridge & Jennings 48] are air-tra c control systems, spacecraft control, telecommunications network management and particle acceleration control. Furthermore, interface agents are used that for instance take care of email administration, as well as information agents that deal with information management and retrieval. In all probability, these implemented agents will be rather complex. In addition, life-critical implementations like air-tra c control systems and spacecraft control systems need to be highly reliable. To guarantee reliability it is probably necessary to use formal methods in the development of these agent systems, since such a guarantee can never be given by just performing tests on the systems. Besides this general reason for using formal techniques in any branch of AI and computer science, there is another reason when dealing with agents. These agents will in general be equipped with features representing common-sense concepts as knowledge, belief and ability. Since most people do have their own conception of these concepts, it is very important to unambiguously establish what is meant by these concepts when ascribed to some speci c implemented agent. Formal speci cations allow for such an unambiguous de nition.
The formal tool that we propose to model agency is modal logic 4, 20, 21] . Using modal logics o ers a number of advantages. Firstly, using an intensional logic like modal logic allows one to come up with an intuitively acceptable formalisation of intensional notions with much less e ort than it would take to do something similar using fully-edged rst-order logic. Secondly, the reducibility of modal logic to (fragments of) rst-order logic ensures that methods and techniques developed for rst-order logic are still applicable to modal logic. Lastly, using possible worlds models as originally proposed by Kripke 25] , provides for a uniform, clear, intelligible, and intuitively acceptable means to give mathematical meaning to a variety of modal operators. The modal systems that we propose to formalise agents belong to what we call the KARO-framework. In this framework, the name of which is inspired by the well-known BDI-architecture 40], special attention is paid to the agents' knowledge and abilities, and to the results of and opportunities for their actions. We present two di erent systems, both belonging to the KARO-framework, that di er in their treatment of abilities for certain actions. To show the expressive power of the framework we formalise various notions that are interesting maybe from a philosophical point of view, but that above all should help to understand and model arti cially intelligent agents|we like to stress that our aim is to describe arti cial agents like softbots and robots by means of these notions, rather than human agents, which are far more complex and for which one probably needs more complicated descriptions.
The agent attitudes in this paper are limited to knowledge, and abilities, results and opportunities with respect to his/its actions, i.e. the KARO framework. We stress that the purpose of this paper is to give a thorough treatment of this KARO framework, which has been used by us as a basis for a much more extensive description of agents, incorporating such notions as observations ( 30] ), communication ( 29] ), default reasoning ( 33] ), belief revision ( 31] ), and goals ( 32] ).
The philosophy adhered to in this endeavour is that the primary attitude of agents is to act, by the very meaning of the word`agent', so that a speci cation logic for the behaviour of agents should start out from a logic of action (for which we have chosen an extension of dynamic logic in which knowledge and ability is expressible as well). In this enterprise we owe to Bob Moore's work combining a version of dynamic logic and epistemic logic for the rst time 37] So here we deviate from the philosophy of other foundational work on agents, in particular that of Rao & George 40, 39, 41] , who take belief, desire, intentions as well as time as primitive notions for agents. (One could argue that our approach is more in line with that of Cohen & Levesque 5] . They, too, take actions as basic building blocks for their theory of agents. However, they consider only models of their framework and provide no formal proof system. Furthermore, they are mainly concerned with the formalisation of motivational attitudes such as goals and intentions of agents, and employ actions merely as a basis to obtain this, while here we are interested in actions and aspects of these, such as opportunities and abilities, in their own right.) Therefore, the main contribution of this paper is to investigate the KARO logic and provide meta-results such as completeness, which, particularly by the addition of abilities, will turn out to be a non-trivial extension of that for basic dynamic logic.
Organisation of the paper The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we look at the philosophical foundations of the KARO-framework. In Section 3 we present the formal de nitions constituting the two systems belonging to the KARO-framework. We start by de ning the language common to the two systems, where-after a common class of models and two di erent interpretations for the formulas from the language in the models are presented. In Section 4 various properties of knowledge and action in the KARO-framework are considered. In Section 5 we consider the notion of practical possibility, and formalise part of the reasoning of agents on the correctness and feasibility of their plans. In Section 6 we present two slightly di erent proof systems that are sound and complete with respect to the notions of validity associated with the two interpretations. Section 7 concludes this paper with a brief summary, an overview of related work, and some suggestions for future research. In the appendix we present the proofs of soundness and completeness in considerable detail. 2 The KARO-framework from a philosophical perspective As mentioned in the previous section, in its simplest form an agent is an entity that performs actions and possesses information. The informational attitude that we equip our agents with is termed knowledge. Our use of the term knowledge agrees with the common one in AI and computer science 14, 36], i.e. knowledge is veridical information with respect to which the agent satis es conditions of both positive and negative introspection. Veridicality implies that only true formulas are known by agents, positive introspection states that agents know that they know something whenever they know it, and negative introspection states that agents know that they do not know something as soon as they do not know it.
To explain the concept of action, we rst have to spend some words on the ontology of states of a airs that we presuppose. By a state of a airs we mean the way the world is, or one way it might be, at a moment. The (currently) actual state of a airs is composed of the facts about the world as it actually is at this very moment. But there are, presumably, various other states of a airs which could have applied to the world as this moment instead, or that would apply as the result of a given action. An agent, with limited knowledge of the facts, might consider various merely hypothetical states of a airs consistent with the agent's knowledge Actions are now considered to be descriptions of causal processes, which upon execution by an agent may turn one state of a airs into another one. Thus, our intuitive idea of actions corresponds to what Von Wright calls the generic view on actions 52]. An event consists of the performance of a particular action by a particular agent, and is as such related to Von Wright's individual view on actions 52]. We will use the plain term events, although perhaps the term agent-driven event would be more appropriate, here. Given the ontology of actions and events as somehow causing transitions between states of a airs, we deem two aspects of these notions to be crucial: when is it possible for an agent to perform an action, and what are the e ects of the event consisting of the performance by a particular agent of a particular action in a particular state of a airs? To investigate these questions we focus on three aspects of actions and events that are in our opinion essential, viz. result, opportunity and ability. Slightly simplifying ideas of Von Wright 51] , we consider any aspect of the state of a airs brought about by the occurrence of an event in some state of a airs to be among the results of that particular event in that particular state of a airs. In adopting this description of results we abstract from all kinds of aspects of results that would probably have to be dealt with in order to come up with an account that is completely acceptable from a philosophical point of view, such as for instance the question whether all changes in a state of a airs have to be ascribed to the occurrence of some event, thereby excluding the possibility of external factors in uencing these changes. However, it is not our aim to provide a complete theory of results incorporating all these aspects, but instead combine results with other notions that are important for agency. From this point of view it seems that our de nition of results is adequate to investigate the e ects of actions, and, given the complexity already associated with this simple de nition, it does not make much sense to pursue even more complex ones.
Along with the notion of the result of events, the notions of ability and opportunity are among the most discussed and investigated in analytical philosophy. Ability plays an important part in various philosophical theories, as for instance the theory of free will and determinism, the theory of refraining and seeing-to-it, and deontic theories. Following Kenny 22], we consider ability to be the complex of physical, mental and moral capacities, internal to an agent, and being a positive explanatory factor in accounting for the agent's performing an action. Opportunity on the other hand is best described as circumstantial possibility, i.e. possibility by virtue of the circumstances. The opportunity to perform some action is external to the agent and is often no more than the absence of circumstances that would prevent or interfere with the performance. Although essentially di erent, abilities and opportunities are interconnected in that abilities can be exercised only when opportunities for their exercise present themselves, and opportunities can be taken only by those who have the appropriate abilities. From this point of view it is important to remark that abilities are understood to be reliable (cf. 2]), i.e. having the ability to perform a certain action su ces to take the opportunity to perform the action every time it presents itself. The combination of ability and opportunity determines whether or not an agent has the (practical) possibility to perform an action.
For our arti cial agents, we will in Section 5 study`correctness' of for i to bring about in terms of having the opportunity: for the arti cial agents that we have in mind and the actions (`programs') they perform correctness has to do with intrinsic (rather than external) features of the action: its halting and the intended outcome. Such features are still beyond the scope of the agent's abilities, of course.
3 The KARO-framework from a formal perspective For the reasons already given in Section 1, we propose the use of a propositional multimodal language to formalise the knowledge and abilities of agents, and the results of and opportunities for their actions. In contrast with most philosophical accounts, but rmly in the tradition of theoretical computer science, this language is an exogenous one, i.e. actions are represented explicitly. Although it is certainly possible to come up with accounts of action without representing actions (see for instance 38, 44]), we are convinced that many problems that plague these endogenous formalisations can be avoided in exogenous ones.
The language contains modal operators to represent the knowledge of agents as well as to represent the result and opportunity of events. The ability of agents is formalised by a factually non-modal operator. Following the representation of Hintikka 17] we use the operator K to refer to the agents' knowledge: K i ' denotes the fact that agent i knows ' to hold. To formalise results and opportunities we borrow constructs from dynamic logic: hdo i ( )i' denotes that agent i has the opportunity to perform the action and that ' will result from this performance. The abilities of agents are formalised through the A operator: A i states that agent i has the ability to perform the action . The class of actions that we consider here is built up from a set of atomic actions using a variety of constructors. These constructors deviate somewhat from the standard actions from dynamic logic 12, 15], but are both well-known from high-level programming languages and somewhat closer to philosophical views on actions than the standard constructors. When de ning the models we will ensure that atomic actions are deterministic, i.e. the event consisting of an agent performing an action in some state of a airs has a unique outcome. As we will see later on this ensures that all actions are deterministic.
De nition 3.1 The language L( ; A; At) is founded on three denumerable, non-empty sets, each of which is disjoint of the others: is the set of propositional variables, A IN is the set of (names of) agents, and At is the set of atomic actions. The alphabet contains the well-known connectives : and^, the epistemic operator K , the dynamic operator hdo ( )i , the ability operator A , the action constructors confirm (con rmations), ; (sequential composition), if then else fi (conditional composition) and while do od (repetitive composition).
De nition 3.2 The language L( ; A; At) is the smallest superset of such that if ' ; ; for the elements of Ac(At) Whenever the sets ; A; At are understood, which we assume to be the case unless explicitly stated otherwise, we write L and Ac rather than L( ; A; At) and Ac(At).
The intuitive interpretation of formulas K i '; hdo i ( )i' and A i is discussed above. The formula M i ' is the dual of K i ' and represents the epistemic possibility of ' for agent i, i.e. on the basis of its knowledge, i considers ' to be possible. The formula do i ( )]' is the dual of hdo i ( )i'; this formula is noncommittal about the opportunity of agent i to perform the action but states that if the opportunity to do is present, then ' would be among the results of do i ( ). The action constructors presented in De nition 3.2 constitute the class of so-called strict programs (cf. 13, 15] In practice this implies that (all) agents have the opportunity to con rm the truth of a certain formula i the formula holds. Execution of such an action does not have any e ects in the case that the formula that is con rmed holds, and leads to the counterfactual state of a airs if the formula does not hold 1 .
Since the action 1 ; 2 is intuitively interpreted as` 1 followed by 2 ', the transition caused by execution of an action 1 ; 2 equals the`sum' of the transition caused by 1 and the one caused by 2 in the state brought about by execution of 1 . In the case that execution of 1 leads to an empty set of states, execution of the action 1 ; 2 also leads to an empty set: there is no escape from the counterfactual state of a airs. In practice this implies that an 1 Originally in dynamic logic 15, 24] these actions were referred to as tests instead of con rmations. As long as one deals with the behaviour of computer programs, the term`test' is quite acceptable. However, as soon as formalisations of (human) agents are concerned, one should be careful with using this term. The common-sense notion of test is that of an action, execution of which provides some kind of information (in our terminology of 31], a test is a`knowledge producing action' and`informative'.). For example dope-tests and eye-tests are performed in order to acquire information on whether some athlete has been taking drugs, or whether someone's eyesight is adequate. The nature of this kind of tests is not captured by the action which just checks for the truth of some proposition, without yielding any information whatsoever. To avoid confusion we have chosen to refer to these latter kinds of actions as con rmations. Thus, in terms of our models, we think of a con rmation as an action that does not change the state, whereas an agent testing for ' might end up in a di erent (epistemic) state. agent has the opportunity to perform a sequential composition 1 ; 2 i it has the opportunity to do 1 (now), and doing 1 results in the agent having the opportunity to do 2 . The results of performing 1 ; 2 equal the results of doing 2 , having done 1 .
Given its intuitive meaning, it is obvious that the transition caused by a conditional composition if ' then 1 else 2 fi equals the one associated with 1 in the case that ' holds and the one caused by execution of 2 in the case that :' holds. This implies that an agent has the opportunity to perform an action if ' then 1 else 2 fi if (it has the opportunity to con rm that) ' holds and it has the opportunity to do 1 , or (it has the opportunity to con rm that) :' holds and the agent has the opportunity to do 2 . The result of performing if ' then 1 else 2 fi equals the result of 1 in the case that ' holds and that of 2 otherwise.
The de nition of the extension r of r 0 for the repetitive composition is based on the idea that execution of the action while ' do od comes down to sequentially testing for the truth of ' and executing until a state is reached in which :' holds. For deterministic while-loops while ' do od, at most one of the actions k = ((confirm'; ) k ; confirm :'), with k 2 IN, has an execution which does not lead to the counterfactual state of a airs. Now if such an action k exists, the resulting state of execution of the while-loop is de ned to be the state resulting from execution of k , and otherwise execution of the loop is taken to lead to the counterfactual state of a airs.
Abilities for composite actions
Whereas the extension r of r 0 for composite actions is more or less standard, the extension c of c 0 as determining the abilities of agents for composite actions, is not. Since we are (among) the rst to give a formal, exogenous account of ability, extending the function c 0 to the class of all actions involves a couple of personal choices.
We start with motivating our de nitions of ability for con rmations and conditional compositions since neither of these is really controversial: the de nition of ability for con rmations is indisputable since it represents a highly personal choice (and there is no accounting for tastes), and that of the ability for the conditional composition is too obvious and natural to be questioned.
We have decided to let an agent have the ability to con rm any formula that is actually true. Since con rmations do not correspond to any actions usually performed by humans, this de nition seems to be perfectly acceptable, or at least it is hard to come up with any convincing counterarguments to it. Note that this de nition implies that in a situation where some proposition is true, (all) agents have both the opportunity and the ability to con rm this proposition.
Let us continue with de ning abilities for conditionally composed actions. For these actions, ability is de ned analogously to opportunity: an agent is able to perform the action if ' then 1 else 2 fi i either it is able to con rm the condition ' and perform 1 afterwards, or it is able to con rm the negation of the condition and perform 2 . In practice this implies that having the ability to perform an action if ' then 1 else 2 fi boils down to being able to do 1 whenever ' holds and being able to do 2 whenever ' does not hold. In our opinion this is the natural way to de ne the ability for conditionally composed actions, thereby accepting the import of some oddities of conditionals like the following. With our de nition, an agent may claim on Tuesday that it has the ability to jump over the moon if it is Wednesday and scratch its nose otherwise' 2 . This may be undesirable, but also note that it is not the same as (the even worse) claim that on Wednesday it is able to jump over the moon.
Whereas the de nitions of the ability for con rmations and conditional compositions are easily explained and motivated, this is not the case for those describing the ability for sequential and repetitive compositions, even though the basic ideas underlying these de nitions are perfectly clear.
Informally, having the ability to perform a sequentially composed action 1 ; 2 is de ned as having the ability to do 1 now, while being able to do 2 as a result of having done 1 . If the opportunity to perform 1 exists, i.e. performing 1 does not result in the counterfactual state of a airs, there is no question concerning the intuitive correctness of this de nition, but things are di erent when this opportunity is absent. It is not clear how the abilities of agents are to be determined in the counterfactual state of a airs. Probably the most acceptable approach would be to declare the question of whether the agent is able to perform an action in the counterfactual state of a airs to be meaningless, which could be formalised by extending the set of truth-values to contain an element representing unde nedness of a proposition. Since this would necessitate a considerable complication of our classical, twovalued approach, we have chosen not to explore this avenue, which leaves us with the task of assigning a classical truth-value to the agents' abilities in the counterfactual state of a airs. In general we see two ways of doing this, the rst of which would be to treat all actions equally and come up with a uniform truth value for the abilities of all agents to perform any action in the counterfactual state of a airs. This approach is relatively simply to formalise, and is in fact the one that we will pursue. The second approach would be to treat each action individually, and determine the agents' abilities through other means, such as by assuming an agent to be in the possession of certain default, or typical, abilities. This approach is further discussed in Section 7. Coming back to the rst approach, it is obvious that | given that there are exactly two truth-values | two ways exist to treat all actions equally with respect to the agents' abilities in the counterfactual state of a airs. The rst of these could be called an optimistic, or bold, approach, and states that agents are omnipotent in the counterfactual state of a airs. According to this approach, in situations where an agent does have the ability but not the opportunity to perform an action 1 it is concluded that the agent has the ability to perform the sequential composition 1 ; 2 for arbitrary actions 2 . The second approach is a pessimistic, or careful one. In this approach agents are assumed to be nilpotent in counterfactual situations. Thus, in situations in which an agent does have the ability but not the opportunity to perform an action 1 it is concluded that the agent is unable to perform the sequential composition 1 ; 2 for all 2 . Note that in the case that the agent has the opportunity to do 1 , optimistic and pessimistic approaches towards the agent's ability to do 1 ; 2 coincide. Although there is a case for both de nitions, neither is completely acceptable. Consider the example of a lion in a cage, which is perfectly well capable of eating a zebra, but ideally never has the opportunity to do so. Using the rst de nition we would have to conclude that the lion is capable of performing the sequential composition`eat zebra; y to the moon', which hardly seems intuitive. Using the second de nition it follows that the lion is unable to perform the action`eat zebra; do nothing', which seems equally counterintuitive. Fortunately, the problems associated with these de nitions are not really serious. They occur 2 these oddities, and, in particular, this example, was suggested by a referee of a preliminary version of this paper only in situations where an agent has the ability but not the opportunity to perform some action. And since it is exactly the combination of opportunity and ability that is important, no unwarranted conclusions can be drawn in these situations. Henceforth, we pursue both the optimistic and the pessimistic approach; in Section 7 we suggest alternative approaches in which the aforementioned counterintuitive situations do not occur.
De ning abilities for while-loops is even more hazardous than for sequential compositions. Intuitively it seems a good point of departure to let an agent be able to perform a while-loop only if it is at any point during execution capable of performing the next step. However, using this intuitive de nition one has to be careful not to jump to undesired conclusions in the case of an action for which execution does not terminate. It seems highly counterintuitive to declare an agent, be it arti cial or not, to have the reliable ability to perform an action that goes on inde nitely. For no agent is eternal: human agents die, arti cial agents break down, and after all even the lifespan of the earth and the universe is bounded. Hence agents should not be able to perform actions that take in nite time. Therefore it seems reasonable to equate the ability to perform a while-loop with the ability to perform some nite-length sequence of con rmations and actions constituting the body of the while-loop, which ends in a con rmation for the negation of the condition of the loop, analogously to the equation used in extending the function r 0 to while-loops. Accepting this equation, it is obvious that the discussion concerning the ability of agents for sequentially composed actions also becomes relevant for the repetitive composition, i.e. also with respect to abilities for while-loops a distinction between optimistic and pessimistic agents can be made. In the case that the whileloop terminates, optimistic and pessimistic approaches coincide, but in the case that execution of the action leads to the counterfactual state of a airs, they di er. Consider the situation of an agent that up to a certain point during the execution of an action while ' do od has been able to perform the con rmation for ' followed by , and now nds itself in a state where ' holds, it is able to do but does not have the opportunity for . An optimistic agent concludes that it would have been able to nish the nite-length sequence constituting the while-loop after the (counterfactual) execution of , and therefore considers itself to be capable of performing the while-loop. A pessimistic agent considers itself unable to nish the sequence, and thus is unable to perform the while-loop. The demand for niteness of execution of the while-loop and the pessimistic view on abilities provide for a very interesting combination. For in order for an agent to be able to perform an action while ' do od it has to have the opportunity to perform all the steps in the execution of while ' do od, possibly except for the last one. Furthermore, as as result of performing the last but one step in the execution the agent should obtain the ability to perform the last one, which is a con rmation for :'. Since ability and opportunity coincide for con rmations this implies that the agent has the opportunity to con rm :', i.e. the agent has the opportunity to perform the last step in the execution of while ' do od. But then the agent has the opportunity to perform all the steps in the execution of the while-loop, and thus has the opportunity to perform the while-loop. Hence in the pessimistic approach the ability to perform a while-loop implies the opportunity!
Formally interpreting knowledge, abilities, results and opportunities
To interpret dynamic and ability formulas from L in a model M for L, the functions r 0 and c 0 from M are extended to deal with composite, i.e. non-atomic actions. To account for the di erence between the optimistic and the pessimistic outlook on the agents' abilities, we de ne two di erent extensions of c 0 , and thereby also two di erent interpretations. The optimistic and the pessimistic approach coincide in their extension of r 0 , but di er in the extension of c 0 for sequentially composed actions, and hence also in their treatment of ability for repetitive compositions. 
Properties of knowledge and actions in the KARO-framework
In this section we look at the properties that knowledge and actions have in the KAROframework. We furthermore consider additional properties, and show how some of these additional properties can be brought about by imposing constraints on the interpretation of atomic actions. We start with the properties of knowledge. When demanding the agents' epistemic accessibility relations to be equivalence relations, the modal operator K indeed formalises the notion of knowledge discussed in Section 2.
Proposition 4.1 For all i 2 A and '; 2 L we have:
The 
Proposition 4.2 is in fact nothing but a formalisation of the intuitive ideas on results and opportunities for composite actions as expressed above. The rst item states that agents have the opportunity to con rm exactly the formulas that are true, and that no state-transition takes place as the result of such a con rmation. The second item deals with the separation of the sequential composition into its elements: an agent has the opportunity to do 1 ; 2 with result i it has the opportunity to do 1 (now) and doing so will result in having the opportunity to do 2 with result . The third item states that a conditionally composed action equals its`then'-part in the case that the condition holds, and its`else'-part if the condition does not hold. The fourth item formalises a sort of xed-point equation for execution of while-loops: if an agent has the opportunity to perform a while-loop then it keeps this opportunity under execution of the body of the loop as long as the condition holds. The result of performing a while-loop is also xed under executions of the body of the loop in states where ' holds, and is determined by the propositions that are true in the rst state where :' holds. Note that a validity like this one does not su ce to axiomatise the repetitive composition: although it captures the idea of while-loops representing xed-points, it fails to force termination, i.e. this formula on its own does not guarantee that agents do not have the opportunity to bring an in nitely non-terminating while-loop to its end. In the proof systems that we present in Section 6 this problem is solved by including suitable proof rules guiding the repetitive composition. The last two items state the normality of do i ( )].
As soon as the abilities of agents come into play, the di erences between j = 1 and j = 0 become visible, in particular for sequential and repetitive compositions. The rst and the fourth items of Proposition 4.3 deal with the actions for which abilities are de ned in a straightforward manner: agents are able to con rm exactly the true formulas, and having the ability to perform a conditional composition comes down to having the`right' ability, dependent on the truth or falsity of the condition. The di erences between the optimistic and the pessimistic outlook on abilities in the counterfactual state of a airs are clearly visible in the other items of Proposition 4.3. Optimistic agents are assumed to be omnipotent in counterfactual situations, and therefore it su ces for the agent to be able to do 2 as a conditional result of doing 1 . A pessimistic agent needs certainty, and therefore demands to have the opportunity to do 1 before concluding anything on its abilities following execution of 1 . This behaviour of optimistic and pessimistic agents is formalised in the second and the third item, respectively. The fth and sixth item formalise an analogous behaviour for repetitive compositions: optimistic agents are satis ed with conditional results (item 5) whereas pessimistic agents demand certainty (item 6).
The compositional behaviour of sequential and repetitive compositions di ers for the two interpretations only in situations where an agent lacks opportunities. If all appropriate opportunities are present, there is no di erence for the two interpretations, a property which is formalised in the following corollary. Where schemas are used to express general properties of knowledge and actions on the syntactic level, frames can be used to do so on the semantic level. Informally speaking, a frame can be seen as a model without a valuation. By leaving out the valuation one may abstract from particular properties of knowledge and actions that are due to the valuation rather than inherently due to the nature of knowledge and/or action itself. Truth in a frame is de ned in terms of truth in all models that can be constructed by adding a valuation to the frame.
De nition 4.5 A frame F for a model M 2 M is a tuple consisting of the elements of M except for the valuation . The class of all frames for models from M is denoted by F. If Since schemas are used to express general properties of knowledge and action syntactically, and frames can be used to do this semantically, the question arises as to how these notions relate. In particular, it is both interesting and important to try to single out rst-order constraints on frames that exactly correspond to certain properties of knowledge and/or action, expressed in the form of schemas. The area of research called correspondence theory deals with nding relations | correspondences | between schemas and ( rst-order expressible) constraints on frames. A modal schema is said to correspond to a rst-order constraint on frames if the schema is satis ed in exactly those frames that obey the constraint. A good introduction into correspondence theory is given in 1].
De nition 4.6 If ' is a schema and F is some frame then F j = ' i F j = for all formulas that are an instantiation of '. If P is a formula in the rst-order language subsuming the functions R; r 0 ; c 0 and equality, then F j = fo P i F satis es P . The schema ' corresponds to the rst-order formula P , notation ' P i 8F; (F j = ' , F j = fo P ).
As already hinted at above, the properties that we require knowledge to obey correspond to constraints on the epistemic accessibility relations R(i). In De nition 3.3 we required these relations to be equivalence relations, and this demand indeed corresponds to knowledge being veridical and satisfying the properties of positive and negative introspection. The proof of the following proposition is standard and well-known from the literature 21, 36]. 
Additional properties of actions
The language L is su ciently expressive to formalise various properties of knowledge, actions and their interplay, that are interesting both from a philosophical point of view as from the point of view of AI. The rst of the properties that we consider here is accordance. Informally speaking, accordant actions are known to behave according to plan, i.e. for an accordant action it will be the case that things that an agent expects | on the basis of its knowledge | to hold in the future state of a airs that will result from it executing the action, are indeed known to be true by the agent when that future state of a airs has been brought about. Accordance of actions may be an important property in the context of agents planning to achieve certain goals. For if the agent knows (now) that performing some accordant action will bring about some goal, then it will be satis ed after it has executed the action: the agent knows that the goal is brought about. From a formal point of view, i-accordance of an action
The notion of determinism was already touched upon in the explanation of De nition 3.3 where it was stated that atomic actions are inherently deterministic. As we will see later on, viz. in Proposition 4.11, the determinism of atomic actions implies that of all actions.
The notion of i-determinism of an action is formalised through the schema hdo i (
Whenever an action is idempotent, consecutively executing the action twice | or in general an arbitrary number of times | will have exactly the same results as performing the action just once. In a sense, the state of a airs reached after the rst performance of the action can be seen as a kind of xed-point of execution of the action. The simplest idempotent action in our framework is the void action skip: performing it once, twice or an arbitrary number of times will not a ect the state of a airs in any way whatsoever. More interesting idempotent actions were determined in our paper on actions that change the agent's epistemic state ( 31] ); there, we claimed that such actions (we distinguished retracting, expanding and revising) have idempotency as a characterising property. Formally, i-idempotence of an action corresponds to the schema do i ( ; )]' $ do i ( )]', or equivalently hdo i ( ; )i' $ hdo i ( )i'.
Agents always have the opportunity to perform realisable actions, regardless of the circumstances, i.e. there never is an external factor that may prevent the performance of such an action. Typical realisable actions are, again, those in which the agent changes its information; an agent always has the opportunity to change its mind. The property of A-realisability relates ability and opportunity. For actions that are A-realisable, ability implies opportunity, i.e. whenever an agent is able to perform the action it automatically has the opportunity to perform it. Realisable actions are trivially A-realisable, and so are actions that no agent is ever capable of performing, but it seems hard to think of non-trivial examples of regular, mundane actions that an agent is able to execute and therefore automatically has the opportunity to do so. Adopting the A-realisability schema as an axiom schema would not be desirable for a general-purpose account of actions, opportunities and abilities, but might be appropriate for some specialized investigations. In any case it is far more reasonable to assume that ability implies opportunity than the reverse, given the fact that`abilities are states that are acquired with e ort whereas] opportunities are there for the taking until they pass' ( 22], p. 133). Realisability of an action for agent i is formalised through the schema hdo i ( )i> in i 2 A; A-realisability of for agent i corresponds to A i ! hdo i ( )i>.
The following de nition summarises the properties discussed above in a formal way.
De nition 4.8 Let 2 Ac be some action, i an agent and let F be a frame. The right-hand side of the following de nitions is to be understood as a schema in '.
We often omit explicit reference to the agent i in the above properties. Then, for instance, naming accordant may either mean that is is i-accordant for all agents i, or that mentioning the particular agent is clear from context, or not important. If Prop is any of the properties de ned above, we say that has the property Prop in F i has the property Prop in every F 2 F.
Here we show how these properties can be brought about to hold for all actions by imposing constraints on the functions R, r 0 and c 0 . On the level of atomic actions, these properties correspond to rst-order expressible constraints on R, r 0 and c 0 . In Proposition 4.10 we present the correspondences for the properties of accordance, determinism, idempotence, realisability and A-realisability, respectively. Since we have de ned two possible interpretations, viz. j = 1 and j = 0 , for schemas from L in frames from F we have to be precise on the meaning of these correspondences.
De nition 4.9 For b 2 bool we de ne the schema ' to correspond to the rst-order formula P given the interpretation j = b i 8F(F j = b ' , F j = fo P ). In such a case, we write ' b P . Proposition 4.10 For atomic actions a 2 At, the following correspondences hold in the class F of frames for M both for b = 1 and b = 0. The left-hand side of these correspondences is to be understood as a schema in '. There simply is no semantic entity to correspond the syntactic schemas with. This implies that it is in general not possible to ensure that arbitrary actions satisfy a certain property. However, it turns out that some of the properties considered above straightforwardly extend from the atomic level to the level of arbitrary actions, regardless of the interpretation that is used. This is in particular the case for the properties of A-realisability and determinism. The properties of idempotence and (A-)realisability are in general undesirable ones. If all actions were idempotent, it would be impossible to walk the roads by taking one step at a time. Realisability would render the notion of opportunity meaningless and A-realisability would tie ability and opportunity in a way that we feel is unacceptable. Therefore we consider neither the lifting result for A-realisability to be very important, nor the absence of such a result for idempotence and realisability. And even though the property of accordance is, or may be, important, it is not one that typically holds in the lively world of human agents. Therefore we consider this property to be an exceptional one, that holds for selected actions only. Hence also for accordance the absence of a lifting result is not taken too seriously.
Correctness and feasibility of actions: practical possibility
Within the KARO-framework, several notions concerning agency may be formalised that are interesting not only from a philosophical point of view, but also when analysing agents in planning systems. The most important one of these notions formalises the knowledge that agents have about their practical possibilities. We consider the notion of practical possibility as relating an agent, an action, and a proposition: agents may have the practical possibility to bring about (truth of) the proposition by performing the action. We think of practical possibility as consisting of two parts, viz. correctness and feasibility. Correctness implies that no external factors will prevent the agent from performing the action and thereby making the proposition true. As such, correctness is de ned in terms of opportunity and result: an action is correct for some agent to bring about some proposition i the agent has the opportunity to perform the action in such a way that its performance results in the proposition being true. Feasibility captures the internal aspect of practical possibility. It states that it is within the agent's capacities to perform the action, and as such is nothing but a reformulation of ability. Together, correctness and feasibility constitute practical possibility. The counterintuitive situations that occurred with respect to the ability of agents as described previously do not take root for practical possibility. That is, a lion that has the ability but not the opportunity to eat a zebra will neither have the practical possibility to eat a zebra rst and thereafter y to the moon nor have the practical possibility to eat a zebra and rest on its laurels afterwards. Thus even though the notion of ability su ers from problems like these, the more important notion of practical possibility does not. The importance of practical possibility manifests itself particularly when ascribing | from the outside | certain qualities to an agent. It seems that for the agent itself practical possibilities are relevant in so far as the agent has knowledge of these possibilities. For one may not expect an agent to act on its practical possibilities if the agent does not know of this possibilities. To formalise this kind of knowledge, we introduce the Can-predicate and the Cannot-predicate. The rst of these predicates concerns the knowledge of agents about their practical possibilities, the latter predicate does the same for their practical impossibilities. The Can-predicate and the Cannot-predicate integrate knowledge, ability, opportunity and result, and seem to formalise one of the most important notions of agency. In fact it is probably not too bold to say that knowledge like that formalised through the Can-predicate, although perhaps in a weaker form by taking aspects of uncertainty into account, underlies all acts performed by rational agents. For rational agents act only if they have some information on both the possibility to perform the act, and its possible outcome; at least in this paper we restrict ourselves to such actions, leaving mere experiments out of our scope. It therefore seems worthwhile to take a closer look at both the Can-predicate and the Cannot-predicate. The following proposition focuses on the behaviour of the means-part of the predicates, which is the in Can i ( ; ') and Cannot i ( ; '). Proposition 5.3 supports the claim about appropriateness of the Can-predicate and Cannotpredicate as formalising knowledge of practical possibilities of actions performed by rational agents. In particular items 6 through 9 and item 14 are genuine indications of the rationality of the agents that we formalised. Consider for example item 7. This item states that whenever an agent knows both that it has the practical possibility to bring about by performing if ' then 1 else 2 fi and that the negation of the condition of if ' then 1 else 2 fi holds, it also knows that performing the else-part of the conditional composition provides the practical possibility to achieve . Conversely, if agent i knows that it has the practical possibility to bring about by performing 2 while at the same time knowing that the proposition ' is false, then the agent knows that performing a conditional composition if ' then 1 else 2 fi would also bring about , regardless of 1 . For since it knows that :' holds, it knows that this compositional composition comes down to the else-part 2 . Items 4 and 11 explicitly use the accordance of actions. For it is exactly this property of accordance that causes the agent's knowledge of its practical possibilities to persist under execution of the rst part of the sequential composition in item 4 and the body of the while-loop in item 11.
In the following proposition we characterise the relation between the Can-predicate and the Cannot-predicate. Furthermore some properties are presented that concern the end-part
Even more than Proposition 5.3 does Proposition 5.4 make out a case for the rationality of agents. Take for example item 3, which states that whenever an agent knows that it has the practical possibility to achieve ' by performing it also knows that does not provide for a means to achieve :'. Items 4 through 7 deal with the decomposition of the end-part of the Can-predicate and the Cannot-predicate, which behaves as desired. Note that the reverse implication of item 5 is not valid: it is quite possible that even though an agent knows that is not correct to bring about (p^:p) it might still be that it knows that is correct for either p or :p. An analogous line of reasoning shows the invalidity of the reverse implication of item 6. Items 8 and 9 formalise that agents can extend their knowledge about their practical (im-)possibilities by combining it with their knowledge of the (conditional) results of actions.
Proof theory
Here we present a proof theory for the semantic framework de ned in the previous section. In general the purpose of a proof theory is to provide a syntactic counterpart of the semantic notion of validity for a given interpretation and a given class of models. The idea is to de ne a predicate denoting deducibility, which holds for a given formula i the formula is valid. This predicate is to be de ned purely syntactically, i.e. it should depend only on the syntactic structure of formulas, without making any reference to semantic notions such as truth, validity, satis ability etc. We present two such predicates, viz.`1 and`0, which characterise the notions of validity associated with j = 1 and j = 0 , respectively. The de nition of these predicates is based on a set of axioms and proof rules, which together constitute a proof system. The proof systems that we de ne deviate somewhat from the ones that are common in (modal) logics, the most notable di erence being the use of in nitary proof rules. Given the relative rarity of this kind of rules, we feel that some explanation is justi ed.
In nitary proof rules
The proof rules that are commonly employed in proof systems, are inference schemes of the form P 1 ; : : :; P m = C, where the premises P 1 ; : : :; P m and the conclusion C are elements of the language under consideration. Informally, a rule like this denotes that one may deduce C as soon as P 1 ; : : :; P m have been deduced. An in nitary 3 In nitary proof systems proofs can be carried out completely within the formal system. A proof is usually taken to be a nite sequence of formulas that are either axioms of the proof system or conclusions of proof rules applied to formulas that appear earlier in the sequence. Since nitary proof rules can be applied as soon as all of their nitely many premises have been deduced, there is no need to step outside of the formal system. In order to apply an in nitary rule, a meta-logical investigation on the deducibility of the (in nitely many) premises needs to be carried out, which makes it in general impossible to carry out proofs completely within the proof system. As such, proofs are no longer`schematically' constructed, and theorems are not recursively enumerable. However, there are also advantages associated with the use of in nitary proof rules. One such advantage is that for some systems strong completeness can be achieved using in nitary proof rules, whereas this is not possible using nitary proof rules (cf. 10, 43] ). The notion of strong completeness implies that fewer sets of formulas are consistent, and in particular that sets of formulas that are seen to be inconsistent can also be proved to be so. After the presentation of the proof systems, we will return to the property of strong completeness in the presence of in nitary rules. Besides the possibility to achieve strong completeness when using in nitary proof rules, there are two other arguments that in uenced our decision to use this kind of rule. The rst of these is its intuitive acceptability. In particular when dealing with notions with an in nitary character, like for instance whileloops, in nitary proof rules provide a much better formalisation of human intuition on the nature of these notions than do nitary proof rules. The second, perhaps less convincing but certainly more compelling, argument is given by the fact that our attempts to come up with nitary axiomatisations remained unavailing.
Logics of capabilities
Before presenting the actual axiomatisations, we rst make some notions precise that were already informally discussed above. An axiom is a schema in L. A proof rule is a schema of the form ' 1 ; ' 2 ; : : : = where ' 1 ; ' 2 ; : : :; are schemas in L. A proof system is a pair consisting of a set of axioms and a set of proof rules. As mentioned above, the presence of in nitary proof rules forces us to adopt a more abstract approach to the notions of deducibility and theorem than the one commonly employed in nitary proof systems. Usually, a formula ' is de ned to be a theorem of some proof system if there exist a nite-length sequence of formulas of which ' is the last element and such that each formula in the sequence is either an instance of an axiom or the conclusion of a proof rule applied to earlier members of the sequence. An alternative formulation, which is equally usable in nitary and in in nitary proof systems, is to de ne ' to be a theorem of a proof system i it belongs to the smallest subset of L containing all (instances of all) axioms and closed under the proof rules. This latter notion of deducibility is actually the one that we will employ here. We de ne a logic for a given proof system to be a subset of L containing all instances of the axioms of the proof system and closed under its proof rules. A formula is a theorem for a given proof system i it is an element of the smallest logic for the proof system. These notions are formalised in De nitions 6.4 through 6.6. To axiomatise the behaviour of while-loops we propose two in nitary rules. Both these rules are based on the idea to equate a repetitive composition while ' do od with the innite set f(confirm '; ) k ; confirm :' j k 2 INg. The two proof rules take as their premises an in nite set of formulas built around this in nite set and have as their conclusion a formula built around while ' do od. To make this idea of`building formulas around actions' explicit, we introduce the concept of admissible forms. The notion of admissible forms as given in De nition 6.1 is an extension of that used by Goldblatt Usually`admissible form' is abbreviated to`afm'. By de nition, each afm has a unique occurrence of the special symbol #. By instantiating this symbol with a formula from L, afms are turned into genuine formulas. If is an afm and 2 L is some formula we denote by ( ) the formula that is obtained by replacing (the unique occurrence of) # in by .
The following de nition introduces two abbreviations that will be used in formulating the in nitary rules. Leaving the context provided by out of consideration, this rules intuitively states that if it is deducible that holds after executing the actions (confirm'; ) k ; confirm :', for every k 2 IN, then it is also deducible that holds after executing while ' do od. The rule used in formalising the ability of agents for while-loops has as its premises the set (:(' l (i; ))) for l 2 IN; 2 Afm(L), and a conclusion (:A i while ' do od). This rule states that whenever it is deducible that an agent i is not capable of performing any of the actions (confirm '; ) k ; confirm :', where k 2 IN, then it is also deducible that the agent is incapable of performing the while-loop itself. Or read in its contrapositive form, that an agent is able to perform a while-loop only if it is able to perform some nite-length sequence of con rmations and actions constituting the while-loop. As such, this rule is easily seen to be the proof-theoretic counterpart of the negated version of the (semantic) de nition of c b for while-loops. For read in its negative form this semantic de nition states that The axioms that are used to build the two proof systems are formulated using the necessity operator for actions, i.e. do ( )] , rather than its dual hdo ( )i . The reason for this is essentially one of convenience: in proving completeness of the axiomatisations it turns out to be useful to deal with two necessity operators, viz. K and do ( )] , to allow proofs by analogy. Since do ( )] and hdo ( )i are inter-de nable this does not create any essential di erences.
De nition 6.3 The following axioms and proof rules are used to constitute the two proof systems that we consider here. Both the axioms as well as the premises and conclusions of the proof rules are to be taken as schemas in i 2 A; '; 2 L and ; 1 ; 2 2 Ac. The occurring in the two in nitary rules I and IA is taken to be a meta-variable ranging over Afm(L).
A1. All propositional tautologies and their epistemic and dynamic instances Most of the axioms are fairly obvious, in particular given the discussion on the validities presented in Section 4. Rule R1, the Omega Iteration rule, is adopted from the axiomatisations given by Goldblatt 10, 11] . Both I and rule R2, which is the Omega Iteration rule for Ability, were already discussed above. Rule R3 is the rule of Modus Ponens, well known from, and used in, both classical and modal logics. R4 and R5 are both instances of the rule of necessitation, which is known to hold for necessity operators. These rules state that whenever some formula is deducible, it is also deducible that an arbitrary agent knows the formula, and that all events have this formula among their conditional results, respectively. Axioms A2 and A6, and the rules R4 and R5 indicate that both knowledge and conditional results are formalised through normal modal operators.
The axioms and proof rules given above are used to de ne two di erent proof systems. One of these proof systems embodies the optimistic view on abilities in the counterfactual state of a airs, the other employs a pessimistic view.
De nition 6.4 The proof system 1 contains the axioms A1 through A12, A13 1 , A14, A15 1 and the proof rules R1 through R5. The proof system 0 contains the axioms A1 through A12, A13 0 , A14, A15 0 and the proof rules R1 through R5.
As mentioned above, a logic for a given proof system is a set encompassing the proof system. De nition 6.5 A b-logic is a set that contains all the instances of the axioms of b and is closed under the proof rules of b . The intersection of all b-logics, which is itself a b-logic, viz. the smallest one, is denoted by LCap b . Whenever the underlying proof system is either irrelevant or clear from the context, we refer to a b-logic simply as a logic.
Deducibility in a given proof system is now de ned as being an element of the smallest logic for the proof system.
De nition 6.6 For some logic, the unary predicate` L is de ned by:` ' , ' 2 .
As an abbreviation we occasionally write`b ' for`L Cap b . Whenever` ' holds we say that ' is deducible in or alternatively that ' is a theorem of .
The proof systems 1 and 0 provide sound and complete axiomatisations of validity for j = 1 and j = 0 respectively. This is summarized in the following theorem, of which the proof is provided in the appendix. Besides the notion of deducibility per se, it is also interesting to look at deducibility from a set of premises. In modal logics one may distinguish two notions of deducibility from premises. In the rst of these, the premises are considered to be additional axioms, on which also rules of necessitation may be applied. The second notion of deducibility allows necessitation only on the axioms of the proof system, and not on the premises. This latter notion of deducibility is perhaps the more natural one, and is in fact the one that we will concentrate on.
To account for deducibility from premises with respect to the alternative notion of deducibility as being an element of some set of formulas, we introduce the notion of a theory of a logic. Corresponding to the idea that the rules of necessitation are not to be applied on premises, we do not demand that a theory be closed under these rules. A formula is now de ned to be deducible from some set of premises i it is contained in every theory that encompasses the set of premises.
Proposition 6.10 For some logic and ' 2 L we have:` ' , ;` '. As already mentioned before, using in nitary rules to describe the behaviour of whileloops allows one to achieve strong completeness, the notion which states that every consistent set of formulas is simultaneously satis able. Achieving strong completeness is in general not possible when just nitary rules are used. To see this consider the set = f do i ( Just as deducibility per se is the proof theoretic counterpart of the semantic notion of validity, there is also a semantic counterpart to the notion of deducibility from premises. In the light of the strong completeness property, Proposition 6.12 is not very surprising. In fact, the left-to-right implication is a direct consequence of the strong completeness property. The right-to-left implication follows from the observation that the set of formulas that is satis ed in some world forms a theory.
Summary and conclusions
In this paper we introduced the KARO-framework, a formal framework based on a combination of various modal logics that can be used to formalise agents. After a somewhat philosophical exposition on knowledge, actions and events, we presented two formal systems, both belonging to the KARO-framework, that share a common language and a common class of models but that di er in the interpretation of dynamic and ability formulas. The language common to the two systems is a propositional, multi-modal, exogenous language, containing modalities representing knowledge, opportunity and result, and an operator formalising ability. The models that are used to interpret formulas from the language L are Kripke-style possible worlds models. These models interpret knowledge by means of an accessibility relation on worlds; opportunity, result and ability are interpreted using designated functions. We explained our intuition on the composite behaviour of results, opportunities and abilities, and presented two formal interpretations that comply with this intuition. These interpretations di er in their treatment of abilities of agents for sequentially composed actions. We considered various properties of knowledge and action in the KARO-framework. In de ning some of these properties we used the notions of schemas, frames and correspondences. Using the various modalities present in the framework, we proposed a formalisation of the knowledge of agents about their practical possibilities, a notion which captures an important aspect of agency, particularly in the context of planning agents. We presented two proof systems that syntactically characterise the notion of validity in the two interpretations that we de ned. The most remarkable aspect of these proof systems is the use of in nitary proof rules, which on the one hand allows for a better correspondence between the semantic notion of validity and its syntactic counterpart, and on the other hand forces one to generalise the usual notions of proof and theorem.
In the KARO-framework we proposed two de nitions for the ability of agents to execute a sequentially composed action 1 ; 2 in cases where execution of 1 leads to the counterfactual state of a airs. The simplicity of these de nitions, both at a conceptual and at a technical level, may lead to counterintuitive situations. Recall that using the so-called optimistic approach it is possible that an agent is considered to be capable of performing ; fail, whereas in the pessimistic approaches agents may be declared unable to perform ; skip, for 2 Ac. A more realistic approach would be not to treat all actions equally, but instead to determine for each action individually whether it makes sense to declare an agent (un)able to perform the action in the counterfactual state of a airs. One way to formalise this consists of extending the models from M with an additional function t : A Ac ! S ! S which is such that t(i; )(s) = r(i; )(s) whenever r(i; )(s) 6 = ;. Hence in the case that r(i; )(s) 6 = ;, t(i; )(s) equals r(i; )(s) and in other cases t(i; )(s) is de nitely not empty. The function t denotes the outcome of actions when`abstracting away' from opportunities, so to speak. The ability for the sequential composition is then de ned by c(i; 1 ; 2 )(s) = 1 , c(i; 1 )(s) = 1 & c(i; 2 )(t(i; 1 )(s)) = 1 Applying this de nition implies that A i 1 ; fail is no longer satis able, and that A i 1 ; skip holds in cases where A i 1 is true, regardless of the truth of hdo i ( 1 )i>. A special instantiation of this approach corresponds to the idea that abilities of agents do not tend to change. Therefore it could seem reasonable to assume that agents retain their abilities when ending up in the counterfactual state of a airs. Formally this can be brought about by demanding t(i; )(s) to equate s in cases where r(i; )(s) = ;. Since this is but a special case of the general idea discussed above, it also avoids the counterintuitive situations where agents are declared to be able to do ; fail or unable to do ; skip.
Rather than restricting ourselves to LCap b we will for the greater part consider general logics, culminating in a very general and rather powerful result from which the soundness and completeness proof for LCap b can be derived as a corollary. Globally, the proof given below can be split into three parts. In the rst part of the proof, canonical models are constructed for the logics induced by the proof systems 1 and 0 . The possible worlds of these canonical models are given by so-called maximal theories. In the second part, the truth-theorem is proved, which states that truth in a possible world of a canonical model corresponds to being an element of the maximal theory that constitutes the possible world. In the last, and almost trivial, part of the proof it is shown how the general truth-theorem implies soundness and completeness of LCap b for b-validity in M.
The de nition of canonical models as we give it is, as far as actions and dynamic constructs are concerned, based on the construction given by Goldblatt 10] . The proof of the truththeorem is inspired by the one given by Spruit 47] to show completeness of the Segerberg axiomatisation for propositional dynamic logic. Due to the fact that formulas and actions are strongly related, the subformula or subaction relation does not provide an adequate support for induction in the proof of the truth-theorem. Instead a fairly complex ordering is used, wellfoundedness of which is proved using some very powerful (and partly automated) techniques that are well-known from the theory of Term Rewriting Systems 7, 23] .
Some preliminary de nitions, propositions and lemmas are needed before the canonical models can be constructed. Up till now, the two proof systems 0 and 1 were dealt with identically, i.e. in none of the de nitions or propositions given above one needs to distinguish the proof systems or the logics based on these proof systems. From this point on, however, we need to treat the two systems, and thereby the logics, di erently. We start with nishing the proof of soundness and completeness for 1-logics, and indicate thereafter how this proof needs to be modi ed to end up with one for 0-logics.
The presence of the con rmation action, which tightly links actions and formulas, prevents the subformula-or subaction-relation from being an adequate parameter for induction in the proof of the truth-theorem, the theorem which links satis ability in a state of the canonical model to being an element of the maximal theory which constitutes the state. Instead we need a more elaborate relation, which is de ned below. Proposition A.22 The ordering < is well-founded.
Proof: The proof of this proposition is quite elaborate; it can be found in 19] where it takes over three pages. Basically, the idea is to use a powerful technique well-known from the theory of Term Rewriting Systems, viz. the lexicographic path ordering. Using this technique it su ces to select an appropriate well-founded precedence on the function symbols of the language in order to conclude that the ordering is well-founded. Since the actual proof is not only rather elaborate but also contains many details that are completely outside the scope of this paper, it is omitted here; those who are interested can nd all details in 19].
Having proved that the ordering < is well-founded, we can use it in the proof of the truth-theorem.
Theorem A.23 (The truth-theorem) Let be some 1-logic. For any ' where r 1 and c 1 are the functions induced by r and c in the way described in De nition 3.4.
The theorem then follows from the rst item, since (0; ') (0; '). So let ' 2 L be some xed formula. We start by proving the rst property. Let 2 L be such that (0; ) (0; ').
Consider the various cases for : The proposition follows, for arbitrary logics, directly from the proof of Proposition A.14. For if is -consistent, then by the procedure given in the proof of Proposition A.14 one constructs a maximal -theory ? that contains . This ? appears as a state in the canonical model for , and by the truth-theorems, all formulas from ? | and hence from | are satis ed at this state. Hence every -consistent set is satis ed at some state of the canonical model for , and since this canonical model is a well-de ned one, the proposition follows.
